Filtered by vendor Actuator
Subscriptions
Total
4 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-68709 | 1 Actuator | 1 Com.alpha.applock | 2026-05-27 | N/A |
| SailingLab AppLock (aka com.alpha.applock) 4.3.8 for Android allows a local attacker to trigger arbitrary JavaScript execution via BrowserMainActivity, which accepts VIEW intents with javascript: URIs. This unsafe navigation path results in script execution and may allow UI spoofing or privilege escalation. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68710 | 1 Actuator | 1 Locker.app.safe.applocker | 2026-05-27 | N/A |
| Easyelife App lock (aka Fingerprint,Applock or locker.app.safe.applocker) 1.9.2 for Android allows a local attacker with physical access to bypass the PIN lock. The lock is implemented as an overlay rather than by using Android's secure authentication APIs. By navigating cascading interface flows - insecure navigation through exposed routes facilitates app control evasion {I.N.T.E.R.F.A.C.E] via advertisement or browser intents - an attacker can evade lockscreen verification and access protected apps (e.g., Chrome), resulting in information disclosure and privilege escalation. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68708 | 1 Actuator | 1 Com.alpha.applock | 2026-05-27 | N/A |
| SailingLab AppLock (aka com.alpha.applock) 4.3.8 for Android allows a local attacker with physical access to bypass the PIN lock. The lock is implemented as an overlay rather than by using Android's secure authentication APIs. By navigating cascading interface flows - insecure navigation through exposed routes facilitates app control evasion {I.N.T.E.R.F.A.C.E] via advertisement or browser intents - an attacker can evade lockscreen verification and access protected apps (e.g., Chrome). This results in information disclosure and privilege escalation. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68711 | 1 Actuator | 1 Applock.passwordfingerprint.applockz | 2026-05-27 | N/A |
| AppLockZ App Lock and Fingerprint Lock (applock.passwordfingerprint.applockz) 4.2.11 for Android allows a local attacker with physical access to bypass the PIN lock. The lock is implemented as an overlay rather than by using Android's secure authentication APIs. By navigating cascading interface flows - insecure navigation through exposed routes facilitates app control evasion {I.N.T.E.R.F.A.C.E] via advertisement or browser intents, an attacker can evade lockscreen verification and access protected apps (e.g., Chrome). This results in information disclosure and privilege escalation. | ||||
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