Total
1656 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-65065 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::roaringbitmap::shared | 2026-07-27 | 5.5 Medium |
| Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in roaring.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65010 | 1 Huggingface | 1 Datasets | 2026-07-27 | 6.6 Medium |
| Datasets through 5.00, fixed in commit ad2d853, contains a symlink-following vulnerability in Extractor.extract() that allows local attackers to write arbitrary files by pre-planting symlinks at predictable output paths. Attackers can redirect archive extraction to arbitrary filesystem locations in shared-cache environments, enabling overwrite of sensitive files and potential privilege escalation or code execution. | ||||
| CVE-2026-39243 | 1 Kevva | 1 Decompress | 2026-07-25 | 5.5 Medium |
| decompress before 4.2.2 allows arbitrary hardlink creation during archive extraction, enabling file read disclosure and file corruption. When processing hardlink entries (type === 'link'), the x.linkname field from the archive is passed directly to fs.link() without validation (index.js line 113). An attacker can craft an archive with a hardlink entry whose linkname is an absolute path to any file on the same filesystem. This creates a hardlink inside the extraction directory that shares the same inode as the target file, enabling both reading and overwriting the original file's content. Hardlinks are limited to files on the same filesystem and cannot target directories. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48855 | 1 Erlang | 4 Erlang/otp, Erlang\/otp, Erlang\/ssh and 1 more | 2026-07-24 | 6.5 Medium |
| Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Erlang OTP ssh (ssh_sftpd module) allows File Discovery. The SSH_FXP_READLINK handler in ssh_sftpd sends the raw result of file:read_link/2 to the client without calling chroot_filename/2 to strip the backend root prefix. An authenticated SFTP client can create a symlink inside the chroot pointing to /; ssh_sftpd resolves the target to the absolute backend root and stores it on disk. Reading the symlink back via SSH_FXP_READLINK returns that absolute path, for example /data/sftp, instead of the chrooted value /. The information disclosed is the absolute filesystem path of the SFTP root directory and of any symlink targets within it. No file contents, credentials, or access to paths outside the root directory are obtainable through this issue alone. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 29.0.2, OTP 28.5.0.2 and OTP 27.3.4.13, corresponding to ssh from 3.0.1 before 6.0.1, 5.5.2.1 and 5.2.11.8. | ||||
| CVE-2026-12391 | 1 Canonical | 2 Ubuntu, Ubuntu-pro-client | 2026-07-23 | 5 Medium |
| An insecure symlink following vulnerability exists in Canonical ubuntu-pro-client (formerly ubuntu-advantage-tools) within the pro collect-logs command framework. The utility creates or utilizes predictable temporary file paths or user-accessible log directories when gathering diagnostic information without verifying the file type or ownership. An unprivileged local attacker can exploit this behavior by creating a symbolic link (symlink) at a predictable destination path pointing to an arbitrary, root-readable file (such as /etc/shadow or private files within /root). When a root administrator or operator subsequently executes the pro collect-logs command, the tool follows the user-controlled symlink, reads the target file, and compresses its contents into the resulting diagnostic support archive. Because the output archive remains readable by the unprivileged user, the attacker can extract and read the sensitive root-owned files, leading to a complete information disclosure of system secrets. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64613 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::buffer::shared | 2026-07-23 | 6.2 Medium |
| Data::Buffer::Shared versions before 0.05 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in buf_generic.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0666). O_EXCL blocks a pre-seeded file on create, but the mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable), and O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed when the segment is attached. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted symlink at the path redirects the open to another file. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64614 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::deque::shared | 2026-07-23 | 3.8 Low |
| Data::Deque::Shared versions before 0.06 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in deque.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64615 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::graph::shared | 2026-07-23 | 3.3 Low |
| Data::Graph::Shared versions before 0.04 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in graph.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64617 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::pubsub::shared | 2026-07-23 | 3.8 Low |
| Data::PubSub::Shared versions before 0.07 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in pubsub.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65061 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::reqrep::shared | 2026-07-23 | 3.8 Low |
| Data::ReqRep::Shared versions before 0.05 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in reqrep.h with open(path, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0666), for both the request-reply and the integer-variant segments. The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65062 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::sortedset::shared | 2026-07-23 | 3.8 Low |
| Data::SortedSet::Shared versions before 0.03 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in sortedset.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65063 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::radixtree::shared | 2026-07-23 | 3.8 Low |
| Data::RadixTree::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in radix.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65064 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::hashmap::shared | 2026-07-23 | 3.8 Low |
| Data::HashMap::Shared versions before 0.14 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in shm_generic.h with open(path, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_CLOEXEC, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65066 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::ringbuffer::shared | 2026-07-23 | 3.8 Low |
| Data::RingBuffer::Shared versions before 0.04 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in ring.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65067 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::intern::shared | 2026-07-23 | 3.8 Low |
| Data::Intern::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in intern.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65068 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::spatialhash::shared | 2026-07-23 | 3.8 Low |
| Data::SpatialHash::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in sphash.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65069 | 1 Egor | 1 Data::disjointset::shared | 2026-07-23 | 4 Medium |
| Data::DisjointSet::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. The segment is created in dsu.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing. A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47121 | 1 Sparkle-project | 1 Sparkle | 2026-07-22 | 6.1 Medium |
| Sparkle is a software update framework for macOS. Prior to version 2.9.2, `Autoupdate/SUBinaryDeltaApply.m` enforces `relativePath.pathComponents containsObject:@".."` and rejects writes whose immediate parent directory IS itself a symbolic link, but does not detect symlinks deeper in the relative path. `Autoupdate/SPUSparkleDeltaArchive.m`'s `extractItem:` will create symlinks in the destination tree from archive content (no `..` check on the symlink target), and a subsequent `Extract` item targeting `<symlink>/foo/bar` then escapes the destination tree via `fopen(path, "wb")` because the kernel resolves the intermediate symlink during the open call. This is a defense-in-depth issue: exploitation requires a maliciously-crafted `.delta` that passes EdDSA signature verification, i.e. EdDSA private-key compromise. With the AppInstaller running as root for system-domain installs, it gives the holder of a stolen signing key arbitrary file write at root level via the delta-apply path, which is a strictly broader primitive than the "drop-in replacement bundle" install they would otherwise have. Version 2.9.2 contains a patch for the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-15788 | 1 Moby | 1 Buildkit | 2026-07-21 | N/A |
| BuildKit's cache mount source= selector on Windows Container on Windows (WCOW) workers does not detect NTFS directory junctions placed inside the cache root. A build authored by an untrusted user on a WCOW-configured BuildKit daemon can read arbitrary host files reachable to the BuildKit daemon process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-58414 | 1 Jovancoding | 1 Network-ai | 2026-07-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.backup()` recursively collects files using `_collectBackupFiles()`. `_collectBackupFiles()` uses `statSync(full)`, which follows symlinks. If `data/<env>` contains a symlink to a directory outside the environment root, backup recursion follows the symlink and copies external files into `data/<env>/.backups/<backupId>/`. An attacker who can place a symlink under the environment data directory can cause backup operations to disclose files outside the environment root into backup artifacts. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `_collectBackupFiles()` now uses `lstatSync` instead of `statSync` and skips any entry where `isSymbolicLink()` is true. Symlinks are never traversed, so `backup()` can no longer follow a link out of the environment root and copy external files into a backup artifact. | ||||