In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix soft lockup from unpadded ASCONF-ACK parameter iteration
sctp_verify_asconf() walks ASCONF-ACK parameters with
sctp_walk_params(), which advances by SCTP_PAD4(length), while the
consumer sctp_get_asconf_response() iterates the same parameters
advancing by the raw length, without padding. A single odd-length
parameter desynchronises the two walks and makes the consumer
interpret attacker-controlled bytes at a misaligned offset.
When those bytes yield a length of zero, the while loop over
asconf_ack_len makes no progress, spinning forever in softirq
context, and the watchdog reports a soft lockup. All reads stay
within the received skb, so the lockup is a pure remote denial of
service. A remote peer can trigger it with a crafted ASCONF-ACK on
an ADD-IP enabled association with an outstanding ASCONF (RFC 5061
section 4.1.2 requires the chunk to be authenticated, but the
predefined empty key id 0 allows the peer to compute the same
association HMAC from publicly exchanged parameters, so the gate
does not help).
The SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE case of sctp_verify_asconf() also performs
no length check, letting a parameter without a complete error
header reach the consumer, which reads errhdr.cause past the end of
the parameter, an out-of-bounds read.
Reject SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE parameters shorter than
sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr) at the
verifier, and advance the consumer iterator with the same padding
rule as the verifier to keep the two walks in lockstep. The verifier
change guarantees a complete error header in every ERR_CAUSE
parameter the consumer can see, so the consumer's asconf_ack_len
check is dropped and it returns err_param->cause directly. The
consumer padding fix is still required because odd lengths remain
valid for SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE per RFC 5061.
The issue was found by ZeroHive, a vulnerability hunting agent at
Tencent Yunding Lab.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
| Vendors | Products |
|---|---|
| Linux |
|
Configuration 1 [-]
|
No data.
References
History
Thu, 22 Oct 2026 17:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-667 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:-:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.3:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
cvssV3_1
|
Sat, 03 Oct 2026 11:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
Tue, 29 Sep 2026 21:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-1023 CWE-125 |
Tue, 29 Sep 2026 13:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-835 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Fri, 25 Sep 2026 12:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-1023 CWE-125 |
Fri, 25 Sep 2026 10:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix soft lockup from unpadded ASCONF-ACK parameter iteration sctp_verify_asconf() walks ASCONF-ACK parameters with sctp_walk_params(), which advances by SCTP_PAD4(length), while the consumer sctp_get_asconf_response() iterates the same parameters advancing by the raw length, without padding. A single odd-length parameter desynchronises the two walks and makes the consumer interpret attacker-controlled bytes at a misaligned offset. When those bytes yield a length of zero, the while loop over asconf_ack_len makes no progress, spinning forever in softirq context, and the watchdog reports a soft lockup. All reads stay within the received skb, so the lockup is a pure remote denial of service. A remote peer can trigger it with a crafted ASCONF-ACK on an ADD-IP enabled association with an outstanding ASCONF (RFC 5061 section 4.1.2 requires the chunk to be authenticated, but the predefined empty key id 0 allows the peer to compute the same association HMAC from publicly exchanged parameters, so the gate does not help). The SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE case of sctp_verify_asconf() also performs no length check, letting a parameter without a complete error header reach the consumer, which reads errhdr.cause past the end of the parameter, an out-of-bounds read. Reject SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE parameters shorter than sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr) at the verifier, and advance the consumer iterator with the same padding rule as the verifier to keep the two walks in lockstep. The verifier change guarantees a complete error header in every ERR_CAUSE parameter the consumer can see, so the consumer's asconf_ack_len check is dropped and it returns err_param->cause directly. The consumer padding fix is still required because odd lengths remain valid for SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE per RFC 5061. The issue was found by ZeroHive, a vulnerability hunting agent at Tencent Yunding Lab. | |
| Title | sctp: fix soft lockup from unpadded ASCONF-ACK parameter iteration | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published: 2026-09-25T10:36:05.993Z
Updated: 2026-10-19T09:14:15.281Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.318Z
Link: CVE-2026-98123
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2026-09-25T11:17:43.600
Modified: 2026-10-22T16:46:55.180
Link: CVE-2026-98123
Redhat