Capgo (Cap-go/capgo.app) contains an authentication bypass affecting all versions (no patched version available at time of publication). The Edge authorization path allows a password-only Supabase aal1 session to exercise privileged RBAC permissions even when the account has a verified MFA factor that has not been used for the session: the Edge JWT middleware (foundJWT() in supabase/functions/_backend/utils/hono_middleware.ts) accepts the JWT without validating its assurance level, and the direct RBAC path (checkPermission()/checkPermissionPg() in supabase/functions/_backend/utils/rbac.ts calling public.rbac_check_permission_direct()) authorizes by user ID without passing or checking the session aal, unlike the public.verify_mfa() control which correctly requires aal2. An attacker who knows only the victim's password can therefore authenticate, mint a persistent app-scoped app_admin API key that remains valid after the aal1 session is logged out, and perform privileged operations such as modifying production OTA channel configurations (validated by changing a public production channel from bundle 1.0.0 to 1.0.1), defeating the protection provided by MFA.
History

Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Sun, 13 Sep 2026 19:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Cap-go
Cap-go cap-go
Vendors & Products Cap-go
Cap-go cap-go

Thu, 10 Sep 2026 13:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Capgo (Cap-go/capgo.app) contains an authentication bypass affecting all versions (no patched version available at time of publication). The Edge authorization path allows a password-only Supabase aal1 session to exercise privileged RBAC permissions even when the account has a verified MFA factor that has not been used for the session: the Edge JWT middleware (foundJWT() in supabase/functions/_backend/utils/hono_middleware.ts) accepts the JWT without validating its assurance level, and the direct RBAC path (checkPermission()/checkPermissionPg() in supabase/functions/_backend/utils/rbac.ts calling public.rbac_check_permission_direct()) authorizes by user ID without passing or checking the session aal, unlike the public.verify_mfa() control which correctly requires aal2. An attacker who knows only the victim's password can therefore authenticate, mint a persistent app-scoped app_admin API key that remains valid after the aal1 session is logged out, and perform privileged operations such as modifying production OTA channel configurations (validated by changing a public production channel from bundle 1.0.0 to 1.0.1), defeating the protection provided by MFA.
Title Capgo AAL1 Session MFA Bypass via Direct RBAC Authorization
Weaknesses CWE-288
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: VulnCheck

Published: 2026-09-10T13:05:18.415Z

Updated: 2026-09-30T17:20:32.771Z

Reserved: 2026-09-10T11:23:56.026Z

Link: CVE-2026-88861

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-09-15T14:13:41.527Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2026-09-10T14:17:11.673

Modified: 2026-09-30T18:18:41.770

Link: CVE-2026-88861

cve-icon Redhat

No data.