The HTTP/2 server in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_http2.c clears the connection's stream binding at the start of every frame. handle_http_frame_header() executed client->current_stream = NULL unconditionally, but a CONTINUATION frame does not open a new stream and enter_http_frame_continuation_state() never re-bound one, so the rest of the header block was processed with client->current_stream unset. Two paths then write through the NULL pointer. A request for an unregistered resource, or a method the matched resource does not support, is answered by send_http2_404() or send_http2_405(), and both call send_headers_frame(), which unconditionally sets client->current_stream->headers_sent = true. A POST, PUT or PATCH to a registered dynamic resource reaches handle_http2_dynamic_resource(), which unlike its siblings (handle_http2_static_resource(), dynamic_get_del_opts_req_v2(), dynamic_post_put_req_v2()) had no client->current_stream == NULL guard, and stores through the pointer with client->current_stream->current_detail = dynamic_detail.
Any peer that can reach the server can trigger this without authentication or prior state. A single stray CONTINUATION frame with END_HEADERS set, sent right after the client preface and requesting any unregistered path, is enough, because nothing rejected a CONTINUATION that no HEADERS frame had opened. A legitimate split header block (a HEADERS frame with END_HEADERS clear whose payload ends on a header-field boundary, then a CONTINUATION with END_HEADERS set) reaches the same state. The in-tree test test_http2_post_headers_with_continuation() did not catch this because it splits the header block mid field, which takes the handle_incomplete_http_header() shortcut that keeps the stream bound.
The result is a write to a fixed low address (a small offset into struct http2_stream_ctx), which faults on mainstream targets (flash/vector-table region on Cortex-M, or a trap under MPU/MMU null-pointer detection), and the default fatal-error handler halts the system. Impact is an unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service against any device running the HTTP/2 server: the 404 path needs no particular resource to be registered, and HTTP/2 is built into CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER with cleartext h2c accepted, so TLS does not prevent it. Neither the target address nor the written value is attacker-controlled, so there is no confidentiality or integrity impact. Applications built without CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER are not affected.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
No data.
No data.
No data.
References
History
Fri, 06 Nov 2026 14:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The HTTP/2 server in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_http2.c clears the connection's stream binding at the start of every frame. handle_http_frame_header() executed client->current_stream = NULL unconditionally, but a CONTINUATION frame does not open a new stream and enter_http_frame_continuation_state() never re-bound one, so the rest of the header block was processed with client->current_stream unset. Two paths then write through the NULL pointer. A request for an unregistered resource, or a method the matched resource does not support, is answered by send_http2_404() or send_http2_405(), and both call send_headers_frame(), which unconditionally sets client->current_stream->headers_sent = true. A POST, PUT or PATCH to a registered dynamic resource reaches handle_http2_dynamic_resource(), which unlike its siblings (handle_http2_static_resource(), dynamic_get_del_opts_req_v2(), dynamic_post_put_req_v2()) had no client->current_stream == NULL guard, and stores through the pointer with client->current_stream->current_detail = dynamic_detail. Any peer that can reach the server can trigger this without authentication or prior state. A single stray CONTINUATION frame with END_HEADERS set, sent right after the client preface and requesting any unregistered path, is enough, because nothing rejected a CONTINUATION that no HEADERS frame had opened. A legitimate split header block (a HEADERS frame with END_HEADERS clear whose payload ends on a header-field boundary, then a CONTINUATION with END_HEADERS set) reaches the same state. The in-tree test test_http2_post_headers_with_continuation() did not catch this because it splits the header block mid field, which takes the handle_incomplete_http_header() shortcut that keeps the stream bound. The result is a write to a fixed low address (a small offset into struct http2_stream_ctx), which faults on mainstream targets (flash/vector-table region on Cortex-M, or a trap under MPU/MMU null-pointer detection), and the default fatal-error handler halts the system. Impact is an unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service against any device running the HTTP/2 server: the 404 path needs no particular resource to be registered, and HTTP/2 is built into CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER with cleartext h2c accepted, so TLS does not prevent it. Neither the target address nor the written value is attacker-controlled, so there is no confidentiality or integrity impact. Applications built without CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER are not affected. | |
| Title | NULL pointer dereference in the Zephyr HTTP/2 server when a header block is completed by a CONTINUATION frame | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-476 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: zephyr
Published: 2026-11-06T14:38:25.629Z
Updated: 2026-11-06T14:38:25.629Z
Reserved: 2026-09-08T18:40:52.193Z
Link: CVE-2026-87045
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
No data.
Redhat
No data.