Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, the shared project permission check trusted a caller-controlled team_id and let the teamOwner/teamAdmin branch continue without confirming that the target project belonged to that team. The vulnerable surface is project routes and related authorization checks that accepted user-controlled project identifiers. An authenticated user who is an owner or admin of their own team submits a victim project id together with the attacker's own team_id in the request body; default self-signup grants the required role on the user's own team. Authorization is evaluated against the attacker-selected team instead of the target project's team, and the update path mass-assigns the request body without a project field allow-list. The attacker needs a valid Chartbrew account, an owner or admin role on their own team, and a victim project identifier; requests without the body team_id trick are rejected. The attacker can re-parent the victim project into their own team, gain full read and write access, expose it publicly, remove password protection, and cause the victim to lose it; the shared delete route also permits cross-tenant deletion. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.
History

Fri, 06 Nov 2026 23:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Chartbrew
Chartbrew chartbrew
Vendors & Products Chartbrew
Chartbrew chartbrew

Fri, 06 Nov 2026 21:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, the shared project permission check trusted a caller-controlled team_id and let the teamOwner/teamAdmin branch continue without confirming that the target project belonged to that team. The vulnerable surface is project routes and related authorization checks that accepted user-controlled project identifiers. An authenticated user who is an owner or admin of their own team submits a victim project id together with the attacker's own team_id in the request body; default self-signup grants the required role on the user's own team. Authorization is evaluated against the attacker-selected team instead of the target project's team, and the update path mass-assigns the request body without a project field allow-list. The attacker needs a valid Chartbrew account, an owner or admin role on their own team, and a victim project identifier; requests without the body team_id trick are rejected. The attacker can re-parent the victim project into their own team, gain full read and write access, expose it publicly, remove password protection, and cause the victim to lose it; the shared delete route also permits cross-tenant deletion. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.
Title Chartbrew: Cross-tenant project takeover via body.team_id in /project routes
Weaknesses CWE-639
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published: 2026-11-06T21:07:29.566Z

Updated: 2026-11-06T21:07:29.566Z

Reserved: 2026-09-04T14:45:10.647Z

Link: CVE-2026-85712

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2026-11-06T21:17:11.373

Modified: 2026-11-06T21:17:11.523

Link: CVE-2026-85712

cve-icon Redhat

No data.