When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper's audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence.
A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response.
This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Fri, 18 Sep 2026 14:45:00 +0000
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| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:apache:zookeeper:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Thu, 17 Sep 2026 20:30:00 +0000
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Wed, 16 Sep 2026 12:30:00 +0000
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| First Time appeared |
Apache
Apache zookeeper |
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| Vendors & Products |
Apache
Apache zookeeper |
Wed, 16 Sep 2026 11:30:00 +0000
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Wed, 16 Sep 2026 09:45:00 +0000
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| Description | When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper's audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence. A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response. This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue. | |
| Title | Apache ZooKeeper: Audit log injection via unsanitized output from multiple sources | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-117 | |
| References |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: apache
Published: 2026-09-16T09:27:46.439Z
Updated: 2026-09-17T19:14:53.953Z
Reserved: 2026-09-01T19:22:00.838Z
Link: CVE-2026-84439
Updated: 2026-09-17T19:14:49.139Z
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2026-09-16T10:16:53.433
Modified: 2026-09-18T14:37:30.650
Link: CVE-2026-84439
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