mcp-fetch checks a fetch target against its SSRF guard without removing the brackets that surround an IPv6 literal. isSafeUrl reads the hostname from the parsed URL, which for a literal such as http://[::1]/ yields the bracketed string, and then tests it with net.isIP. That call returns zero for a bracketed value, so the branch holding the private-address checks is skipped entirely. The guard falls back to resolving the hostname, the bracketed string is not a resolvable name, no addresses are returned, and the target is reported safe. The HTTP client then strips the brackets and connects. Because the address may be given in IPv4-mapped form, the same path reaches any IPv4 target the loopback and private checks were meant to exclude, including link-local metadata endpoints. isPrivateIPv6 also has no case for the ::ffff: prefix, so the mapped form would still pass even if the brackets were removed. The fetch target is supplied as a tool argument, so an attacker who can influence what the model requests can read internal responses back into the model context.
History

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 21:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Kazuph
Kazuph mcp-fetch
Vendors & Products Kazuph
Kazuph mcp-fetch

Wed, 26 Aug 2026 13:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Wed, 26 Aug 2026 10:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description mcp-fetch checks a fetch target against its SSRF guard without removing the brackets that surround an IPv6 literal. isSafeUrl reads the hostname from the parsed URL, which for a literal such as http://[::1]/ yields the bracketed string, and then tests it with net.isIP. That call returns zero for a bracketed value, so the branch holding the private-address checks is skipped entirely. The guard falls back to resolving the hostname, the bracketed string is not a resolvable name, no addresses are returned, and the target is reported safe. The HTTP client then strips the brackets and connects. Because the address may be given in IPv4-mapped form, the same path reaches any IPv4 target the loopback and private checks were meant to exclude, including link-local metadata endpoints. isPrivateIPv6 also has no case for the ::ffff: prefix, so the mapped form would still pass even if the brackets were removed. The fetch target is supplied as a tool argument, so an attacker who can influence what the model requests can read internal responses back into the model context.
Title mcp-fetch through 1.6.3 Server-Side Request Forgery via Unstripped IPv6 Literal Brackets
Weaknesses CWE-918
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: VulnCheck

Published: 2026-08-26T10:09:47.977Z

Updated: 2026-08-26T12:05:24.996Z

Reserved: 2026-08-26T09:56:49.602Z

Link: CVE-2026-80347

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-08-26T12:05:12.020Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-26T10:16:42.803

Modified: 2026-08-26T13:19:24.960

Link: CVE-2026-80347

cve-icon Redhat

No data.