{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-78165", "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "apache", "dateReserved": "2026-08-23T12:53:32.309Z", "datePublished": "2026-10-19T10:08:06.783Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-20T13:08:03.518Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "shortName": "apache", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T10:08:17.232Z"}, "title": "Apache Camel: Camel-Spring-Redis Unfiltered Java Deserialization of Redis Payloads", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"description": "CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data", "lang": "en", "cweId": "CWE-502", "type": "CWE"}]}], "source": {"discovery": "UNKNOWN"}, "affected": [{"vendor": "Apache Software Foundation", "product": "Apache Camel", "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2", "packageName": "org.apache.camel:camel-spring-redis", "packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.apache.camel/camel-spring-redis", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "2.11.0", "lessThan": "4.18.5", "versionType": "maven"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "4.19.0", "lessThan": "4.22.1", "versionType": "maven"}, {"status": "unaffected", "version": "4.18.5", "versionType": "maven"}, {"status": "unaffected", "version": "4.22.1", "versionType": "maven"}, {"status": "unaffected", "version": "4.23.0", "versionType": "maven"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "descriptions": [{"value": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Spring Redis component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 2.11.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.\n\n\n\nRedisConfiguration.getSerializer lazily built a bare JdkSerializationRedisSerializer whenever no serializer option was configured, and that instance was used for every read the component performs. Spring's implementation delegates through DeserializingConverter to DefaultDeserializer, which reads the bytes with a ConfigurableObjectInputStream and installs no java.io.ObjectInputFilter on the stream, so an arbitrary serialized class graph was materialised and its readObject method executed. RedisConsumer.setBody applied that serializer to the raw bytes of every message published to the subscribed channels, before the Exchange was constructed and therefore before any route logic could inspect the message, so an actor able to issue PUBLISH on a subscribed channel reached the deserialization sink directly. The same default serializer backed the RedisTemplate built by RedisConfiguration.createDefaultTemplate, so the producer read commands GET, HGET, HGETALL and HVALS deserialized whatever was stored in the Redis keyspace, and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository shared that template. Configuring a custom redisTemplate did not close the consumer path, because RedisConsumer.setBody reads getSerializer directly rather than the serializer attached to the template, so a deployment that had wired a String serializer into its own template remained exposed on the consumer side unless it also set the serializer option. The component never constructed a java.io.ObjectInputStream itself, which is why earlier passes over the Camel codebase for unfiltered Java deserialization did not reach it. The behaviour dates back to the introduction of the component, first released in 2.11.0, and was unchanged until this fix.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.", "lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "<p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Spring Redis component.</p><p>This issue affects Apache Camel: from 2.11.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.</p><p>RedisConfiguration.getSerializer lazily built a bare JdkSerializationRedisSerializer whenever no serializer option was configured, and that instance was used for every read the component performs. Spring's implementation delegates through DeserializingConverter to DefaultDeserializer, which reads the bytes with a ConfigurableObjectInputStream and installs no java.io.ObjectInputFilter on the stream, so an arbitrary serialized class graph was materialised and its readObject method executed. RedisConsumer.setBody applied that serializer to the raw bytes of every message published to the subscribed channels, before the Exchange was constructed and therefore before any route logic could inspect the message, so an actor able to issue PUBLISH on a subscribed channel reached the deserialization sink directly. The same default serializer backed the RedisTemplate built by RedisConfiguration.createDefaultTemplate, so the producer read commands GET, HGET, HGETALL and HVALS deserialized whatever was stored in the Redis keyspace, and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository shared that template. Configuring a custom redisTemplate did not close the consumer path, because RedisConsumer.setBody reads getSerializer directly rather than the serializer attached to the template, so a deployment that had wired a String serializer into its own template remained exposed on the consumer side unless it also set the serializer option. The component never constructed a java.io.ObjectInputStream itself, which is why earlier passes over the Camel codebase for unfiltered Java deserialization did not reach it. The behaviour dates back to the introduction of the component, first released in 2.11.0, and was unchanged until this fix.</p><p>Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.</p>"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-78165.html", "name": "Apache Camel Security Advisory - CVE-2026-78165", "tags": ["vendor-advisory"]}, {"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24421", "name": "CAMEL-24421", "tags": ["issue-tracking"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25587", "name": "Fix on main, released in 4.23.0 (commit 8db602a5ee105403fa40c1b821157c8d9d0c1977)", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25588", "name": "Backport to camel-4.22.x, released in 4.22.1 (commit b2ba1ed90562e10e07bfb4a3cab60b817885e6de)", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25589", "name": "Backport to camel-4.18.x, released in 4.18.5 (commit e721141ddcaeb9a08892730942b1b362c2da1c5c)", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25734", "name": "Upgrade-guide documentation placed on main (commit ddc7885a7add93326b3d549c565c43bbccad12dc)", "tags": ["related"]}], "metrics": [{"scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}], "format": "CVSS", "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"}}], "workarounds": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate, because the consumer reads getSerializer directly. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "<p>Set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate, because the consumer reads getSerializer directly. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.</p>"}]}], "solutions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. A new deserializationFilter endpoint option controls the filter applied while the default serializer reads Redis payloads; when it is not set, the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter is honoured if present, and otherwise a conservative default allow-list is applied that permits standard Java and Apache Camel types and denies java.net. On 4.23.0 and 4.22.1 the default additionally enforces the JEP-290 graph-shape limits maxdepth, maxrefs and maxbytes; on 4.18.5 the equivalent local constant is applied without those limits. Because JdkSerializationRedisSerializer exposes no hook for installing a filter, the serializer is constructed through its Converter-based constructor with a deserializing converter that sets the filter on the stream before the graph is read. The single change covers the consumer, the producer read commands and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "<p>Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. A new deserializationFilter endpoint option controls the filter applied while the default serializer reads Redis payloads; when it is not set, the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter is honoured if present, and otherwise a conservative default allow-list is applied that permits standard Java and Apache Camel types and denies java.net. On 4.23.0 and 4.22.1 the default additionally enforces the JEP-290 graph-shape limits maxdepth, maxrefs and maxbytes; on 4.18.5 the equivalent local constant is applied without those limits. Because JdkSerializationRedisSerializer exposes no hook for installing a filter, the serializer is constructed through its Converter-based constructor with a deserializing converter that sets the filter on the stream before the graph is read. The single change covers the consumer, the producer read commands and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository.</p>"}]}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Leon Zlobecki", "type": "finder"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "Andrea Cosentino", "type": "remediation developer"}], "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.3"}}, "adp": [{"references": [{"url": "https://github.com/oscerd/CVE-2026-78165", "tags": ["exploit"]}], "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-10-20T03:55:35.397588Z", "id": "CVE-2026-78165", "options": [{"Exploitation": "poc"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "total"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-20T13:08:03.518Z"}}]}}

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Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. A new deserializationFilter endpoint option controls the filter applied while the default serializer reads Redis payloads; when it is not set, the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter is honoured if present, and otherwise a conservative default allow-list is applied that permits standard Java and Apache Camel types and denies java.net. On 4.23.0 and 4.22.1 the default additionally enforces the JEP-290 graph-shape limits maxdepth, maxrefs and maxbytes; on 4.18.5 the equivalent local constant is applied without those limits. Because JdkSerializationRedisSerializer exposes no hook for installing a filter, the serializer is constructed through its Converter-based constructor with a deserializing converter that sets the filter on the stream before the graph is read. The single change covers the consumer, the producer read commands and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. A new deserializationFilter endpoint option controls the filter applied while the default serializer reads Redis payloads; when it is not set, the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter is honoured if present, and otherwise a conservative default allow-list is applied that permits standard Java and Apache Camel types and denies java.net. On 4.23.0 and 4.22.1 the default additionally enforces the JEP-290 graph-shape limits maxdepth, maxrefs and maxbytes; on 4.18.5 the equivalent local constant is applied without those limits. Because JdkSerializationRedisSerializer exposes no hook for installing a filter, the serializer is constructed through its Converter-based constructor with a deserializing converter that sets the filter on the stream before the graph is read. The single change covers the consumer, the producer read commands and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository.</p>", "base64": false}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-78165.html", "name": "Apache Camel Security Advisory - CVE-2026-78165", "tags": ["vendor-advisory"]}, {"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24421", "name": "CAMEL-24421", "tags": ["issue-tracking"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25587", "name": "Fix on main, released in 4.23.0 (commit 8db602a5ee105403fa40c1b821157c8d9d0c1977)", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25588", "name": "Backport to camel-4.22.x, released in 4.22.1 (commit b2ba1ed90562e10e07bfb4a3cab60b817885e6de)", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25589", "name": "Backport to camel-4.18.x, released in 4.18.5 (commit e721141ddcaeb9a08892730942b1b362c2da1c5c)", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25734", "name": "Upgrade-guide documentation placed on main (commit ddc7885a7add93326b3d549c565c43bbccad12dc)", "tags": ["related"]}], "workarounds": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate, because the consumer reads getSerializer directly. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate, because the consumer reads getSerializer directly. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.</p>", "base64": false}]}], "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.3"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Spring Redis component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 2.11.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.\n\n\n\nRedisConfiguration.getSerializer lazily built a bare JdkSerializationRedisSerializer whenever no serializer option was configured, and that instance was used for every read the component performs. Spring's implementation delegates through DeserializingConverter to DefaultDeserializer, which reads the bytes with a ConfigurableObjectInputStream and installs no java.io.ObjectInputFilter on the stream, so an arbitrary serialized class graph was materialised and its readObject method executed. RedisConsumer.setBody applied that serializer to the raw bytes of every message published to the subscribed channels, before the Exchange was constructed and therefore before any route logic could inspect the message, so an actor able to issue PUBLISH on a subscribed channel reached the deserialization sink directly. The same default serializer backed the RedisTemplate built by RedisConfiguration.createDefaultTemplate, so the producer read commands GET, HGET, HGETALL and HVALS deserialized whatever was stored in the Redis keyspace, and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository shared that template. Configuring a custom redisTemplate did not close the consumer path, because RedisConsumer.setBody reads getSerializer directly rather than the serializer attached to the template, so a deployment that had wired a String serializer into its own template remained exposed on the consumer side unless it also set the serializer option. The component never constructed a java.io.ObjectInputStream itself, which is why earlier passes over the Camel codebase for unfiltered Java deserialization did not reach it. The behaviour dates back to the introduction of the component, first released in 2.11.0, and was unchanged until this fix.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Spring Redis component.</p><p>This issue affects Apache Camel: from 2.11.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.</p><p>RedisConfiguration.getSerializer lazily built a bare JdkSerializationRedisSerializer whenever no serializer option was configured, and that instance was used for every read the component performs. Spring's implementation delegates through DeserializingConverter to DefaultDeserializer, which reads the bytes with a ConfigurableObjectInputStream and installs no java.io.ObjectInputFilter on the stream, so an arbitrary serialized class graph was materialised and its readObject method executed. RedisConsumer.setBody applied that serializer to the raw bytes of every message published to the subscribed channels, before the Exchange was constructed and therefore before any route logic could inspect the message, so an actor able to issue PUBLISH on a subscribed channel reached the deserialization sink directly. The same default serializer backed the RedisTemplate built by RedisConfiguration.createDefaultTemplate, so the producer read commands GET, HGET, HGETALL and HVALS deserialized whatever was stored in the Redis keyspace, and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository shared that template. Configuring a custom redisTemplate did not close the consumer path, because RedisConsumer.setBody reads getSerializer directly rather than the serializer attached to the template, so a deployment that had wired a String serializer into its own template remained exposed on the consumer side unless it also set the serializer option. The component never constructed a java.io.ObjectInputStream itself, which is why earlier passes over the Camel codebase for unfiltered Java deserialization did not reach it. The behaviour dates back to the introduction of the component, first released in 2.11.0, and was unchanged until this fix.</p><p>Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.</p>", "base64": false}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-502", "description": "CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "shortName": "apache", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T10:08:17.232Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-78165", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-20T13:08:03.518Z", "dateReserved": "2026-08-23T12:53:32.309Z", "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "datePublished": "2026-10-19T10:08:06.783Z", "assignerShortName": "apache"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "packageName": "org.apache.camel:camel-spring-redis", "packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.apache.camel/camel-spring-redis", "product": "Apache Camel", "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4.18.5", "status": "affected", "version": "2.11.0", "versionType": "maven"}, {"lessThan": "4.22.1", "status": "affected", "version": "4.19.0", "versionType": "maven"}, {"status": "unaffected", "version": "4.18.5", "versionType": "maven"}, {"status": "unaffected", "version": "4.22.1", "versionType": "maven"}, {"status": "unaffected", "version": "4.23.0", "versionType": "maven"}]}], "source": "security@apache.org"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Spring Redis component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 2.11.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.\n\n\n\nRedisConfiguration.getSerializer lazily built a bare JdkSerializationRedisSerializer whenever no serializer option was configured, and that instance was used for every read the component performs. Spring's implementation delegates through DeserializingConverter to DefaultDeserializer, which reads the bytes with a ConfigurableObjectInputStream and installs no java.io.ObjectInputFilter on the stream, so an arbitrary serialized class graph was materialised and its readObject method executed. RedisConsumer.setBody applied that serializer to the raw bytes of every message published to the subscribed channels, before the Exchange was constructed and therefore before any route logic could inspect the message, so an actor able to issue PUBLISH on a subscribed channel reached the deserialization sink directly. The same default serializer backed the RedisTemplate built by RedisConfiguration.createDefaultTemplate, so the producer read commands GET, HGET, HGETALL and HVALS deserialized whatever was stored in the Redis keyspace, and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository shared that template. Configuring a custom redisTemplate did not close the consumer path, because RedisConsumer.setBody reads getSerializer directly rather than the serializer attached to the template, so a deployment that had wired a String serializer into its own template remained exposed on the consumer side unless it also set the serializer option. The component never constructed a java.io.ObjectInputStream itself, which is why earlier passes over the Camel codebase for unfiltered Java deserialization did not reach it. The behaviour dates back to the introduction of the component, first released in 2.11.0, and was unchanged until this fix.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks."}], "id": "CVE-2026-78165", "lastModified": "2026-10-20T14:17:01.450", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "impactScore": 5.9, "source": "security@apache.org", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-78165", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-10-20T03:55:35.397588Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-10-19T11:17:19.643", "references": [{"source": "security@apache.org", "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-78165.html"}, {"source": "security@apache.org", "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25587"}, {"source": "security@apache.org", "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25588"}, {"source": "security@apache.org", "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25589"}, {"source": "security@apache.org", "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25734"}, {"source": "security@apache.org", "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24421"}, {"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "url": "https://github.com/oscerd/CVE-2026-78165"}], "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org", "vulnStatus": "Undergoing Analysis", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-502"}], "source": "security@apache.org", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{"bugzilla": {"description": "org.apache.camel/camel-spring-redis: camel-spring-redis: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted Java deserialization", "id": "2555476", "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2555476"}, "csaw": false, "cvss3": {"cvss3_base_score": "8.8", "cvss3_scoring_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "status": "draft"}, "cwe": "CWE-502", "details": ["A flaw was found in Apache Camel's camel-spring-redis component. By default, the component relies on an unfiltered Java deserializer to process messages received from Redis channels or stored keys. An attacker with permission to publish messages or write data to the Redis instance can exploit this issue by supplying a crafted serialized payload, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution."], "name": "CVE-2026-78165", "package_state": [{"cpe": "cpe:/a:redhat:camel_spring_boot:4", "fix_state": "Affected", "package_name": "camel-spring-redis", "product_name": "Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4"}, {"cpe": "cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_fuse:7", "fix_state": "Affected", "package_name": "camel-spring-redis", "product_name": "Red Hat Fuse 7"}], "public_date": "2026-10-19T10:08:06Z", "references": ["https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-78165\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78165\nhttps://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-78165.html\nhttps://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25587\nhttps://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25588\nhttps://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25589\nhttps://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25734\nhttps://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24421"], "threat_severity": "Important"}