Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in erlef oidcc allows an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate an arbitrary user via an encrypted ID token or JARM response carrying no nested signature. OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 2 requires that an encrypted ID token be signed then encrypted, with the result being a Nested JWT, and JARM processing rule 5 requires the client to check the signature unconditionally. oidcc instead accepted a JWE wrapping unsigned claims as fully validated, so anyone holding the relying party's public encryption key could mint a token with an arbitrary sub, iss, and aud without possessing the provider's signing key. In oidcc_jwt_util:verify_decrypted_token/4, a decrypted payload that is not a signed JWS fell back to parsing the plaintext claims and returning them with no verifying key. oidcc_token:int_validate_jwt/4 then matched on the JOSE structure type rather than on whether a signature had been verified, and returned success. The JARM path in oidcc_token:validate_jarm/3 is reachable through the browser front channel. UserInfo responses are not affected, because OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 5.3.2 permits them to be encrypted without also being signed. This issue affects oidcc: from 3.2.0-beta.1 before 3.9.0.
History

Mon, 31 Aug 2026 21:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Erlef oidcc Plug
Vendors & Products Erlef oidcc Plug

Mon, 31 Aug 2026 15:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Sun, 30 Aug 2026 01:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in erlef oidcc allows an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate an arbitrary user via an encrypted ID token or JARM response carrying no nested signature. OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 2 requires that an encrypted ID token be signed then encrypted, with the result being a Nested JWT, and JARM processing rule 5 requires the client to check the signature unconditionally. oidcc instead accepted a JWE wrapping unsigned claims as fully validated, so anyone holding the relying party's public encryption key could mint a token with an arbitrary sub, iss, and aud without possessing the provider's signing key. In oidcc_jwt_util:verify_decrypted_token/4, a decrypted payload that is not a signed JWS fell back to parsing the plaintext claims and returning them with no verifying key. oidcc_token:int_validate_jwt/4 then matched on the JOSE structure type rather than on whether a signature had been verified, and returned success. The JARM path in oidcc_token:validate_jarm/3 is reachable through the browser front channel. UserInfo responses are not affected, because OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 5.3.2 permits them to be encrypted without also being signed. This issue affects oidcc: from 3.2.0-beta.1 before 3.9.0.
Title Encrypted ID token or JARM response accepted without a nested signature in erlef oidcc
First Time appeared Erlef
Erlef oidcc
Weaknesses CWE-347
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:erlef:oidcc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Erlef
Erlef oidcc
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 7.6, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: EEF

Published: 2026-08-30T01:12:43.435Z

Updated: 2026-08-31T14:53:35.902Z

Reserved: 2026-08-21T09:30:01.395Z

Link: CVE-2026-75759

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-08-31T14:53:30.342Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-30T02:18:30.110

Modified: 2026-08-31T15:17:44.500

Link: CVE-2026-75759

cve-icon Redhat

No data.