In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[] pvcalls_front_event_handler() takes req_id directly from the backend-supplied ring response and uses it to index the fixed-size bedata->rsp[] array for a memcpy() and a store, with no range check. A malicious or buggy backend can set req_id past PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING and drive an out-of-bounds write past the bedata allocation. req_id was also declared int while the wire field rsp->req_id is u32, so a range check on the signed value alone is insufficient: a backend req_id of 0xffffffff becomes -1, passes a >= PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING test and indexes bedata->rsp[-1]. Declare req_id as u32 so a single bound covers both ends. A backend that sends an out-of-range req_id has violated the wire protocol, so rather than silently dropping the response, log once and stop trusting the backend: set bedata->disabled. The event handler then ignores further responses, and the request paths that wait for a response return -EIO instead of blocking forever. This mirrors the fatal-error handling xen-netback uses (xenvif_fatal_tx_err()). The pvcalls frontend currently trusts its backend, so this is not a classic-Xen security issue, but it matters for hardening PV frontends against malicious backends (confidential and disaggregated deployments).
History

Wed, 19 Aug 2026 12:15:00 +0000


Mon, 17 Aug 2026 18:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-787

Mon, 17 Aug 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-787

Mon, 17 Aug 2026 06:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}


Sat, 15 Aug 2026 18:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-787

Sat, 15 Aug 2026 06:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[] pvcalls_front_event_handler() takes req_id directly from the backend-supplied ring response and uses it to index the fixed-size bedata->rsp[] array for a memcpy() and a store, with no range check. A malicious or buggy backend can set req_id past PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING and drive an out-of-bounds write past the bedata allocation. req_id was also declared int while the wire field rsp->req_id is u32, so a range check on the signed value alone is insufficient: a backend req_id of 0xffffffff becomes -1, passes a >= PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING test and indexes bedata->rsp[-1]. Declare req_id as u32 so a single bound covers both ends. A backend that sends an out-of-range req_id has violated the wire protocol, so rather than silently dropping the response, log once and stop trusting the backend: set bedata->disabled. The event handler then ignores further responses, and the request paths that wait for a response return -EIO instead of blocking forever. This mirrors the fatal-error handling xen-netback uses (xenvif_fatal_tx_err()). The pvcalls frontend currently trusts its backend, so this is not a classic-Xen security issue, but it matters for hardening PV frontends against malicious backends (confidential and disaggregated deployments).
Title xen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[]
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published: 2026-08-15T05:56:12.866Z

Updated: 2026-08-17T05:43:30.909Z

Reserved: 2026-08-09T03:40:39.922Z

Link: CVE-2026-72380

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-15T06:22:11.493

Modified: 2026-08-17T06:18:42.380

Link: CVE-2026-72380

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-08-15T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2026-72380 - Bugzilla