In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res); without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes hif_drv->assoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be validated before the driver accesses the fixed header. For a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps. For a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of 65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at buffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data (CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an out-of-bounds read of res->status_code at offsets 2 and 3. Reject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the header or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure on this path: the caller falls through to a "conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS" check after the parser returns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short response be treated as a successful association.
History

Wed, 12 Aug 2026 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Important


Mon, 10 Aug 2026 18:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-125

Mon, 10 Aug 2026 12:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res); without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes hif_drv->assoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be validated before the driver accesses the fixed header. For a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps. For a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of 65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at buffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data (CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an out-of-bounds read of res->status_code at offsets 2 and 3. Reject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the header or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure on this path: the caller falls through to a "conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS" check after the parser returns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short response be treated as a successful association.
Title wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published: 2026-08-10T12:00:14.686Z

Updated: 2026-08-10T12:00:14.686Z

Reserved: 2026-07-30T09:28:09.374Z

Link: CVE-2026-68196

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-10T13:20:07.023

Modified: 2026-08-10T13:20:07.023

Link: CVE-2026-68196

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Important

Publid Date: 2026-08-10T12:00:14Z

Links: CVE-2026-68196 - Bugzilla