TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, any authenticated user with a valid `fctr_session` cookie can submit arbitrary Python source in the `script_code` field of `POST /api/react/execute-script`, without administrator privilege. In `src/api/routers/react_stream.py`, the source is stored with `skip_discovery=True`, bypassing AI-based content filtering, and is passed to `validate_generated_code` in `src/utils/security_config.py`. `BLOCKED_PATTERNS` recognizes direct `__import__` calls but misses the import name passed as a string, `getattr` is in `ALLOWED_BUILTINS`, and the AST checker handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` targets but fails to handle `ast.Call` targets. Dynamic `getattr` call chains through `__builtins__` therefore evade validation. The `_write_temp_script` helper writes the accepted code to disk, and `asyncio.create_subprocess_exec()` executes it as the application process user, which is root in the default container. Command output is returned as Server-Sent Events through `GET /api/react/stream-react-updates?process_id=<id>`. The resulting container compromise can disclose environment secrets including Okta API tokens and the JWT key, expose the SQLite database, and permit backend-service pivoting and persistence. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Tue, 03 Nov 2026 17:00:00 +0000
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| First Time appeared |
Fctr-id
Fctr-id okta-ai-agent |
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| Vendors & Products |
Fctr-id
Fctr-id okta-ai-agent |
Mon, 02 Nov 2026 19:30:00 +0000
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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Fri, 30 Oct 2026 22:30:00 +0000
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| Description | TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, any authenticated user with a valid `fctr_session` cookie can submit arbitrary Python source in the `script_code` field of `POST /api/react/execute-script`, without administrator privilege. In `src/api/routers/react_stream.py`, the source is stored with `skip_discovery=True`, bypassing AI-based content filtering, and is passed to `validate_generated_code` in `src/utils/security_config.py`. `BLOCKED_PATTERNS` recognizes direct `__import__` calls but misses the import name passed as a string, `getattr` is in `ALLOWED_BUILTINS`, and the AST checker handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` targets but fails to handle `ast.Call` targets. Dynamic `getattr` call chains through `__builtins__` therefore evade validation. The `_write_temp_script` helper writes the accepted code to disk, and `asyncio.create_subprocess_exec()` executes it as the application process user, which is root in the default container. Command output is returned as Server-Sent Events through `GET /api/react/stream-react-updates?process_id=<id>`. The resulting container compromise can disclose environment secrets including Okta API tokens and the JWT key, expose the SQLite database, and permit backend-service pivoting and persistence. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta. | |
| Title | TAKO AI Agent for Okta: Authenticated Python execution through validator bypass | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-94 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published: 2026-10-30T22:19:39.743Z
Updated: 2026-11-02T17:57:56.881Z
Reserved: 2026-07-16T17:39:30.170Z
Link: CVE-2026-63378
Updated: 2026-11-02T17:09:32.705Z
Status : Deferred
Published: 2026-10-30T23:17:14.410
Modified: 2026-11-02T19:35:33.347
Link: CVE-2026-63378
No data.