Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature. _verify_encrypted_assertion decrypts the EncryptedAssertion and returns it as verified when it carries no signature, via "return $xml unless $xpath->exists('dsig:Signature', $assert);". The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP's encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service. Any caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected.
History

Mon, 03 Aug 2026 20:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Mon, 03 Aug 2026 16:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Timlegge
Timlegge net::saml2
Vendors & Products Timlegge
Timlegge net::saml2

Mon, 03 Aug 2026 13:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature. _verify_encrypted_assertion decrypts the EncryptedAssertion and returns it as verified when it carries no signature, via "return $xml unless $xpath->exists('dsig:Signature', $assert);". The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP's encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service. Any caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected.
Title Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature
Weaknesses CWE-347
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: CPANSec

Published: 2026-08-03T13:00:23.347Z

Updated: 2026-08-03T19:57:38.266Z

Reserved: 2026-07-28T17:55:20.903Z

Link: CVE-2026-18108

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-08-03T19:57:32.876Z

cve-icon NVD

No data.

cve-icon Redhat

No data.