The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
A2a-java
A2a-java a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx |
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| Vendors & Products |
A2a-java
A2a-java a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx |
Wed, 18 Nov 2026 06:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:30:00 +0000
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| Description | The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b). | |
| Title | Vert.x HTTP client forwards Authorization and all headers to cross-authority redirect target when followRedirects(true) | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-522 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: redhat-cnalr
Published: 2026-11-17T14:21:40.347Z
Updated: 2026-11-17T18:04:59.755Z
Reserved: 2026-11-17T14:10:49.362Z
Link: CVE-2026-130627
Updated: 2026-11-17T18:04:46.827Z
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-17T15:17:40.190
Modified: 2026-11-17T19:17:56.787
Link: CVE-2026-130627
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