The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).
History

Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared A2a-java
A2a-java a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx
Vendors & Products A2a-java
A2a-java a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx

Wed, 18 Nov 2026 06:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).
Title Vert.x HTTP client forwards Authorization and all headers to cross-authority redirect target when followRedirects(true)
Weaknesses CWE-522
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: redhat-cnalr

Published: 2026-11-17T14:21:40.347Z

Updated: 2026-11-17T18:04:59.755Z

Reserved: 2026-11-17T14:10:49.362Z

Link: CVE-2026-130627

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-11-17T18:04:46.827Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-11-17T15:17:40.190

Modified: 2026-11-17T19:17:56.787

Link: CVE-2026-130627

cve-icon Redhat

No data.