Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 14.6.0 until 22.7.9 and 23.1.2, Nx creates Unix domain sockets for its daemon and isolated plugin workers in shared temporary locations without owner-only directory and socket permissions. Another unprivileged local account on a shared build server, developer host, or multi-user container can discover and connect to a running socket because the transport performs no authentication and relies on filesystem containment. The daemon's PROCESS_IN_BACKGROUND request accepts a module path and invokes its default export, allowing a caller that controls a file to execute code as the account running Nx; other handlers can expose workspace file contents, project graphs, and task hashes. Disabling the daemon alone does not remove the vulnerable plugin-worker sockets, while single-user machines without another local account are not exposed. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.9 and 23.1.2.
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Affected Vendors & Products
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History
Mon, 05 Oct 2026 12:15:00 +0000
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| Weaknesses | CWE-379 | |
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threat_severity
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cvssV3_1
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Sun, 04 Oct 2026 06:30:00 +0000
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ssvc
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Fri, 02 Oct 2026 18:45:00 +0000
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Nrwl
Nrwl nx |
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Nrwl
Nrwl nx |
Fri, 02 Oct 2026 17:15:00 +0000
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| Description | Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 14.6.0 until 22.7.9 and 23.1.2, Nx creates Unix domain sockets for its daemon and isolated plugin workers in shared temporary locations without owner-only directory and socket permissions. Another unprivileged local account on a shared build server, developer host, or multi-user container can discover and connect to a running socket because the transport performs no authentication and relies on filesystem containment. The daemon's PROCESS_IN_BACKGROUND request accepts a module path and invokes its default export, allowing a caller that controls a file to execute code as the account running Nx; other handlers can expose workspace file contents, project graphs, and task hashes. Disabling the daemon alone does not remove the vulnerable plugin-worker sockets, while single-user machines without another local account are not exposed. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.9 and 23.1.2. | |
| Title | Nx daemon and plugin worker sockets are accessible to other local users | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-269 CWE-732 |
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cvssV4_0
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published: 2026-10-02T16:59:48.238Z
Updated: 2026-10-02T17:28:06.022Z
Reserved: 2026-10-02T14:38:43.244Z
Link: CVE-2026-104854
Updated: 2026-10-02T17:27:54.811Z
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2026-10-02T17:17:04.070
Modified: 2026-10-02T18:17:01.960
Link: CVE-2026-104854