InvoicePlane is a self-hosted open source application for managing invoices, clients, and payments. In version 1.7.2, an authorization guard to Users::change_password(), was added to address a previous authorization flaw that allowed a secondary administrator (user_type=1, user_id != 1) to directly change the password of the primary administrator (user_id=1) through users/change_password/{id}. That remediation, however, protects only the direct password-change operation. It does not protect the identity attribute that password recovery actually trusts: user_email. Users::form() applies no equivalent object-level authorization check when editing the primary administrator's account, and user_email is not included in PROTECTED_FIELDS. A secondary administrator can therefore rewrite the primary administrator's email address, then drive the public password-recovery flow — which resolves the account by user_email — to receive the reset token and take over user_id=1. The result is an alternate attack path that achieves the same impact PR #1638 was intended to prevent: cross-administrator full account takeover of the primary administrator. This issue has been patched via commit 8616fa4.
History

Tue, 29 Sep 2026 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Mon, 28 Sep 2026 22:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Invoiceplane
Invoiceplane invoiceplane
Vendors & Products Invoiceplane
Invoiceplane invoiceplane

Mon, 28 Sep 2026 20:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description InvoicePlane is a self-hosted open source application for managing invoices, clients, and payments. In version 1.7.2, an authorization guard to Users::change_password(), was added to address a previous authorization flaw that allowed a secondary administrator (user_type=1, user_id != 1) to directly change the password of the primary administrator (user_id=1) through users/change_password/{id}. That remediation, however, protects only the direct password-change operation. It does not protect the identity attribute that password recovery actually trusts: user_email. Users::form() applies no equivalent object-level authorization check when editing the primary administrator's account, and user_email is not included in PROTECTED_FIELDS. A secondary administrator can therefore rewrite the primary administrator's email address, then drive the public password-recovery flow — which resolves the account by user_email — to receive the reset token and take over user_id=1. The result is an alternate attack path that achieves the same impact PR #1638 was intended to prevent: cross-administrator full account takeover of the primary administrator. This issue has been patched via commit 8616fa4.
Title InvoicePlane: Incomplete Authorization Remediation in Users::form() Enables Primary Administrator Account Takeover via Email Reassignment and Password Recovery
Weaknesses CWE-863
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published: 2026-09-28T20:15:17.155Z

Updated: 2026-09-29T13:51:08.087Z

Reserved: 2026-09-25T19:19:54.699Z

Link: CVE-2026-100371

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-09-29T13:51:04.059Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2026-09-28T21:17:11.653

Modified: 2026-09-30T19:57:08.043

Link: CVE-2026-100371

cve-icon Redhat

No data.