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Total
16 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-95111 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-10-20 | N/A |
| A memory-protected ThreadX module's queue request reaches the Module Manager's dispatch layer, which decides how much of the module's buffer the privileged queue copy may touch and hands that extent to the module port's range check. A queue's `tx_queue_message_size` is a count of `ULONG`s and the copy moves that many words, so the extent is `message_size * sizeof(ULONG)` bytes. The front-send dispatcher passed the word count itself. `tx_queue_send` and `tx_queue_receive`, either side of it in the same header, have always multiplied. A source buffer ending `message_size` bytes into memory the module may read was therefore accepted, and `_txe_queue_front_send` then read `message_size * sizeof(ULONG)` bytes from it in privileged mode — `3 * message_size` bytes past the end of what the module is allowed to read. The words are written into the queue's message area, so a module that can receive from that queue reads them back. | ||||
| CVE-2026-94192 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-10-20 | N/A |
| A ThreadX module allocates the control blocks of its kernel objects from the Module Manager's object pool, and can ask for that memory back by address with `txm_module_object_deallocate`. The manager released it whatever was in it, including a control block the kernel was still using. Deallocation is not deletion: the object stays on the created list for its type, a thread stays wherever it was on the ready or suspension lists and stays schedulable, and an active timer stays on the timer list. The byte pool is meanwhile free to hand those same bytes to the next allocation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-95109 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-10-20 | N/A |
| The Cortex-A7 MMU Modules port validates a caller-supplied buffer by translating **one address** — the first byte. The common Module Manager hands its range check the module instance, the start address and the complete byte size; the Cortex-A7 implementation discarded the instance and the size and asked the MMU a single question about the start. A memory-protected module therefore passed any range whose first byte was user-readable, however far the rest of it reached. Privileged dispatch code then read or wrote the whole range. Because every protected-module dispatcher that consumes a buffer or an extra-parameter array goes through this one macro, the defect is not in any individual service: it is in the primitive all of them rely on. | ||||
| CVE-2026-94023 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-10-20 | N/A |
| A ThreadX module reaches a kernel object's delete service through the Module Manager's dispatch layer, which asked one question about the pointer: does the object lie outside the module's own code and data. That is the policy for *using* an object, and using an object a module does not own is supported and intended — `txm_module_object_pointer_get_extended` searches the system's created objects by name and hands back objects the application created and objects other modules created, so that a module can send to a shared queue, take a shared semaphore or get a shared mutex. Destroying one of those is not sharing it. A module could name any object it had a pointer to and have the privileged dispatcher delete it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-94024 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-10-20 | N/A |
| The Module Manager's object lookup validated one byte of a memory-protected module's search name and then walked as much of it as the module declared, in privileged mode, with the kernel's preemption count raised. Both lookup dispatchers are affected: the recommended `txm_module_object_pointer_get_extended` is handed a length and does not use it to bound the buffer, and the deprecated `txm_module_object_pointer_get` supplies the largest value a `UINT` can hold, so it removes the bound rather than lacking one. A module can make the walk unbounded without knowing anything about the memory it reaches, and where the walk reaches memory a privileged read cannot take, the resulting fault leaves the kernel unable to preempt for the rest of the system's life. Vulnerable functions: `_txm_module_manager_txm_module_object_pointer_get_dispatch`, `_txm_module_manager_txm_module_object_pointer_get_extended_dispatch` (both in `common_modules/module_manager/inc/txm_module_manager_dispatch.h`) and `_txm_module_manager_object_name_compare` (`common_modules/module_manager/src/txm_module_manager_util.c`). | ||||
| CVE-2026-95108 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-10-20 | N/A |
| One logical thread of a user-mode ThreadX module costs the Module Manager's shared object pool two allocations, not one. The module asks for a `TX_THREAD` control block through `txm_module_object_allocate`; `_txm_module_manager_thread_create` then takes a second allocation of `TXM_MODULE_KERNEL_STACK_SIZE` bytes for the privileged kernel stack that thread's system calls run on, and records it in the control block. Both come from `_txm_module_manager_object_pool` and both are linked onto the module's allocation list. The Module Manager's thread-delete dispatcher released only the first. The kernel stack stayed allocated until the whole module was stopped, so a module that creates, terminates and deletes threads in a loop — every state transition valid, every service returning `TX_SUCCESS` — removed a fixed block from a finite pool shared by the manager and by every other loaded module, on every cycle, for as long as it stayed loaded. Once the pool is exhausted, no memory-protected module can create any kernel object and no user-mode module thread can be created anywhere in the system. Vulnerable function: `_txm_module_manager_tx_thread_delete_dispatch`, in `common_modules/module_manager/inc/txm_module_manager_dispatch.h`. | ||||
| CVE-2026-94202 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-10-20 | N/A |
| The Module Manager's block-pool create dispatcher proved that two `ALIGN_TYPE` words of the extra-parameter array a memory-protected module supplies lay inside the module's data, and then used indices 0 through 3 of that array. One of the two unproved words is read by the dispatcher's own buffer check, which takes index 1 as the pool start and index 2 as the length to range-check it over. So the out-of-bounds read is performed by the validation code itself, before the kernel service is reached, and the size the caller's pool start is then validated against is a word the manager has not proved the module owns. The other unproved word is read when the service's argument list is built. Vulnerable function: `_txm_module_manager_tx_block_pool_create_dispatch`, in `common_modules/module_manager/inc/txm_module_manager_dispatch.h`. | ||||
| CVE-2026-95107 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-10-20 | N/A |
| A ThreadX module chooses `object_size` when it calls `txm_module_object_allocate`. The Module Manager adds its own 16-byte private header to that size and asked the object pool for the result **without checking the addition**. A size near the top of a `ULONG` wrapped, the pool served a block far smaller than the header, and the manager then wrote the header past the end of it and into the neighbouring byte-pool block. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102757 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-10-02 | N/A |
| An unprivileged, memory-protected ThreadX module can have the kernel read and write memory at addresses of its choosing, in privileged mode, and can use that to clear the MPU enable bit and remove its own isolation boundary. The Module Manager decided whether a privileged service could dereference an object address a module named by asking only whether that address fell outside the module. The manager's object pool is outside every module, so the test was satisfied by an address shifted into the interior of one of the module's own privileged allocations, which denotes no object at all. The bytes such an address presents as a control block are bytes the module put there through ordinary create and set services, so the control block ID at the front of them could be made to read as any type the module chose, and the `_txe_` layer's ID test then agreed. The reported chain uses that to reach a privileged `memset` across an attacker-chosen range. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102709 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| Improper validation of non-secure (NS) pointers in multiple TrustZone-M non-secure callable (NSC) entry functions allows an attacker executing in the non-secure world to supply pointers to secure memory. The secure firmware subsequently dereferences these attacker-controlled pointers without verifying that they reference non-secure memory, resulting in unintended disclosure of secure memory contents. This violates the isolation guarantees provided by Arm TrustZone-M and can be leveraged as a memory disclosure or corruption primitive that may enable recovery of sensitive cryptographic material. | ||||
| CVE-2026-0648 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2026-04-18 | 7.8 High |
| The vulnerability stems from an incorrect error-checking logic in the CreateCounter() function (in threadx/utility/rtos_compatibility_layers/OSEK/tx_osek.c) when handling the return value of osek_get_counter(). Specifically, the current code checks if cntr_id equals 0u to determine failure, but @osek_get_counter() actually returns E_OS_SYS_STACK (defined as 12U) when it fails. This mismatch causes the error branch to never execute even when the counter pool is exhausted. As a result, when the counter pool is depleted, the code proceeds to cast the error code (12U) to a pointer (OSEK_COUNTER *), creating a wild pointer. Subsequent writes to members of this pointer lead to writes to illegal memory addresses (e.g., 0x0000000C), which can trigger immediate HardFaults or silent memory corruption. This vulnerability poses significant risks, including potential denial-of-service attacks (via repeated calls to exhaust the counter pool) and unauthorized memory access. | ||||
| CVE-2025-55079 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2025-10-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In Eclipse ThreadX before version 6.4.3, the thread module has a setting of maximum priority. In some cases the check of that maximum priority wasn't performed, allowing, as a result, to obtain a thread with higher priority than expected and causing a possible denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2025-55080 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2025-10-22 | 7.1 High |
| In Eclipse ThreadX before 6.4.3, when memory protection is enabled, syscall parameters verification wasn't enough, allowing an attacker to obtain an arbitrary memory read/write. | ||||
| CVE-2025-55078 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2025-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In Eclipse ThreadX before version 6.4.3, an attacker can cause a denial of service (crash) by providing a pointer to a reserved or unmapped memory region. Vulnerable system calls had a check of pointers, but that check wasn't verifying whether the pointer is outside the module memory region. | ||||
| CVE-2024-2214 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2025-02-13 | 7 High |
| In Eclipse ThreadX before version 6.4.0, the _Mtxinit() function in the Xtensa port was missing an array size check causing a memory overwrite. The affected file was ports/xtensa/xcc/src/tx_clib_lock.c | ||||
| CVE-2024-2212 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Threadx | 2025-02-13 | 7.3 High |
| In Eclipse ThreadX before 6.4.0, xQueueCreate() and xQueueCreateSet() functions from the FreeRTOS compatibility API (utility/rtos_compatibility_layers/FreeRTOS/tx_freertos.c) were missing parameter checks. This could lead to integer wraparound, under-allocations and heap buffer overflows. | ||||
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